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Discussion: What Have We Learned from the
New Suite of Risk Management Programs of the
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008?
Bradley D. Lubben and James L. Novak
New revenue-based support programs in the 2008 Farm Bill represent a fundamental shift in
farm programs and risk management decision-making. However, complexity, uncertainty,
economics, and, arguably, an incomplete analysis of the new Average Crop Revenue Election
(ACRE) program all contributed to low enrollment in the new program in 2009. An effective
analysis of ACRE should consider farm programs as part of an integrated risk management
portfolio, including crop insurance, marketing, and other risk management tools as opposed
to a separate lottery program. Improving this integration could be one of the most significant
consequences of the 2008 Farm Bill.
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The 2008 Farm Bill clearly delivered a new,
much more complex farm income safety net to
producers. On top of the existing price-based
support programs (marketing loans, Direct Pay-
ments [DPs], and Counter-Cyclical Payments
[CCPs]), the federally subsidized crop insurance
programs, and the history of ad hoc disaster as-
sistance programs, Congress added two revenue-
based support programs: the Average Crop
Revenue Election (ACRE) program and the
Supplemental Revenue (SURE) assistance pro-
gram. Both represent a shift toward revenue in
the design of farm income support policy. ACRE
focuses on crop-specific revenue instead of price.
SURE focuses disaster assistance on whole-farm
crop revenue instead of crop-specific quantity
and quality losses. Both will impact farm pro-
gram, crop insurance, marketing, and other risk
management decisions in very different ways
than traditional federal farm policy.
Contributions of the Presented Papers
The invited papers consider these differences and
analyze the impact of the new programs. All of
the papers seem to see ACRE as more insurance-
like than a historic farm program support mech-
anism. Barnaby et al. analyzed and addressed
ACRE and SURE as being adjunct insurance
products. ACRE was characterized as ‘‘a put
option.’’ Zulauf et al. examine overlaps between
insurance and the two programs. Harris com-
ments specifically about the offsets of reduc-
tions in DPs and marketing loan protection
under ACRE with the SURE program. Historic
farm programs (2002 and previous), although
designed to reduce income risk, have not gen-
erally been analyzed as insurance programs,
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 2010 Southern Agricultural Economics Associationwhich brings up a question: is this a fundamental
shift in farm and political thinking? Will future
farm programs and insurance products finally be
linked together in some rational fashion? Barnaby
et al. seem to indicate that this will be the case, at
least on the insurance side.
Harris did a good job of outlining the po-
litical situation surrounding the implementa-
tion of the ACRE program and the reasons for
southern region lack of participation. Prefarm
bill discussions and analysis may have led
farmers to hope for more than they got out of
the program. It certainly led to a lot of confu-
sion. As presented by Barnaby et al., discus-
sions ranged from program payments triggered
by farm-level losses to those triggered by
county or state losses to the current law re-
quiring both farm-level and state-level triggers.
In the South, current law reducing DP and loan
rates under ACRE participation led to less than
favorable comparisons of ACRE to the Direct
and Counter-Cyclical Program (DCP). This
was especially the case for cotton and peanut
producers and for the reasons outlined by
Harris. Figure 1 provides a relative comparison
of the effective price protection provided by
ACRE in 2009. The effective price that would
trigger ACRE payments is 90% of the ACRE
guarantee price (2-year marketing year national
average price) assuming no yield deviation
from the ACRE benchmark. From cotton and
peanut producer perspectives, the new ACRE
program offered no better effective price pro-
tection than the existing DCP; thus, the cut in
the DP and the marketing loan rate meant
a penalty for ACRE participants. Thankfully
for those producers, the existing DCP was
preserved. For several other commodities
(corn, sorghum, wheat, and soybeans), ACRE
offered a substantially higher price protection
level relative to the existing DCP. For SURE,
Harris also did well in highlighting the partial
offset for reduced DPs and marketing loan rates
experienced under ACRE. Tradeoffs and al-
ternatives with insurance products were also
well covered by Barnaby et al.
In all three studies, SURE, ACRE, and in-
surance are characterized as protecting the
revenue of the farm operation. From a risk
protection standpoint, although farm yields (5-
year Olympic averages based on planted acre-
age) are part of the farm-level trigger for
ACRE, national prices (2-year average) instead
of more current posted county or Crop Revenue
Coverage (CRC) insurance prices are part of
the farm revenue trigger. Zulauf et al. high-
lighted these differences and the fundamental
timing of coverage and a relationship to CRC.
Cup and cap imposed limits are also signifi-
cant, especially in times of volatile (downside)
swings in market prices.
Notably excluded from all three papers, it
should be noted that whole farm revenue in-
surance products also already exist. These are
Figure 1. Relative Support Levels by Program Crop for 2009 (Source: USDA Farm Service
Agency)
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characterized as a group risk program. As
pointed out in the Barnaby paper, group risk
insurance products also exist. The comple-
mentary and potentially competing nature of
these products was noted in the papers. For
crop insurance vs. ACRE, Zulauf et al. found
‘‘the overlap in coverage to be less than five
percent of all ACRE payments.’’ Barnaby et al.
seem to make a stronger case for linkages of
SURE, ACRE, and insurance.
Illinois and Kansas results are found to vary
as a result of climate (Zulauf et al.). Barnaby
et al. characterize regional differences as the
difference between an in-the-money and an
out-of-the money put, which should be ad-
justed. However, we would argue, at least for
the Southeast, that this adjustment took place
by farmers voting not to participate with their
most significant cash crops.
In Kansas and Illinois, the crops (corn,
beans, wheat) did not trigger loan program
payments during the study period. This would
contrast to cotton and peanut crops as high-
lighted by Harris. He stated, ‘‘The comparative
higher production and base value of these crops
create greater participation costs for the pro-
ducer if ACRE is elected. Low prices would be
a significant factor in southern participation.
Basically cotton and peanuts were way out of
the money (refer again to Figure 1 for ACRE
support levels relative to existing marketing
loan and CCP support levels). The premium
cost of participation was too high. As Zulauf
et al said: ‘‘...over the 2002 to 2008 crop years,
counter-cyclical payments have been made each
year to cotton, in all but one year to peanuts, and
in four years to rice. To many corn belt pro-
ducers, this stark difference in payment history
suggests that, while the counter-cyclical pro-
gram is addressing the risk faced by southern
program crop producers, it does not address the
risks they face.’’
The Zulauf et al. and Barnaby et al. papers
both looked at crops for which the program was
designed. This was highlighted in the Zulauf
et al. paper. Harris listed some of the differences
in southern (or at least southeastern) crop pro-
duction from the Midwest. For cotton pro-
duction, current insurance products and DCP
farm programs seem to offer more protection
than ACRE. For peanuts, there are additional
marketing issues. We do not believe the double
signup issue was as important as the foregoing
issues. However, the complexity and newness of
the program and confusion attending its imple-
mentationcertainlywerefactorsinparticipation.
Analysis Framework
Thus, beyond program costs and expected pro-
gram payments, arguably the increased com-
plexity of the new programs is perhaps a reason
for low participation in ACRE in 2009 with na-
tional enrollment at less than 10% of farms and
15% of acreage (USDA Farm Service Agency,
2009). Another compelling reason for the low
signup could be a fundamental shortcoming in
the way producers think (and the way educators
teach) regarding this complex set of farm pro-
gram payments and participation decisions.
Producers often think of farm program pay-
ments and decisions as separate and distinct from
their farm production and risk management de-
cisions. The introduction of fixed, decoupled
payments in the 1996 Farm Bill (later to be
named Direct Payments) that allowed flexibility
in production decisions (and ‘‘freedom to farm’’)
likely contributed to this mindset. In this separate
and distinct view, farm programs are a separate
lottery to be maximized (or optimized over
a risk–return frontier). In this lottery framework,
producers rightly consider ACRE to be more
risky than DCP. For Midwestern crops (corn,
soybeans, sorghum, wheat), the DCP program
includes a guaranteed fixed DP and virtually no
expectation of CCPs or marketing loan benefits.
In comparison, ACRE includes only 80% of the
DP in addition to a risky ACRE payment. Thus,
for ACRE to be preferred to DCP in the lottery
framework, the expected ACRE payment would
have to average more than the 20% foregone DP
to be preferred by a risk-neutral producer and
would have to average even more to offset the
increased riskiness of ACRE payments faced by
a risk-averse producer. Evidence of this mindset
a n da v e r s i o nt oA C R Es h o w e du pi nf a r m e r
discussions and accounts during the signup pe-
riod, including a Kansas producer quoted by
DTN/The Progressive Farmer as saying ‘‘...what
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would be much more volatile, versus the steady
money in direct payments’’ (Hill, 2009).
However, ACRE, DCP, and other farm pro-
grams are best thought of not as a separate lottery,
but as part of the producer’s risk management
portfolio. From this perspective, analyzing farm
program payments and crop revenue together
presents an almost opposite conclusion. ACRE
is by definition inversely correlated to crop rev-
enue on the farm. Even under scenarios of low
correlation between farm and state yields, the
required farm trigger implies ACRE payments
occur on the farm only when farm crop revenue
is average or less. Because ACRE is inversely
correlated with crop revenue, the expected in-
come from ACRE plus crop revenue is less
risky than the expected income from DCP plus
crop revenue. Although ACRE may be more
risky than DCP, ACRE plus crop revenue is less
risky than DCP plus crop revenue. Thus, the
risk-averse producer should actually have been
willing to give up some expected return and
still have preferred ACRE to DCP as opposed
to demanding more returns from ACRE before
signing up for it.
None of the papers consider a complete
analysis of this lottery vs. portfolio issue. Fur-
thermore, none of the farm program decision
tools available fromExtension andother sources
across the country during signup in 2009 fully
considered this relationship. Many of the avail-
able decision tools analyzed expected farm
program payments using a deterministic method.
Some analyzed expected farm program pay-
ments in a stochastic framework. None analyzed
farm program payments plus crop revenue in
a stochastic framework. Had the decision been
presented this way, the interest and participa-
tion in ACRE might have been substantially
higher.
Having noted the shortcomings of the pa-
pers and the Farm Bill educational efforts in
general in addressing this risk management
portfolio decision, it should also be noted that
very little comprehensive analysis of the com-
plete risk management portfolio exists. It may
be because of the inherent complexity of the
analysis. A recent study of producer risk man-
agement decisions illustrates this complexity
in noting that producers effectively face more
than 4,000 combinations of crop insurance and
marketing tools to consider (Pennings et al.,
2008). Under such complexity, producers are
unabletoconsiderallpossibilitiesandareforced
to bracket or segment their decisions. It is ex-
actly this type of segmented analysis that de-
scribes the producer’s lottery perspective on
ACREand may explainthelower-than-expected
enrollment in ACRE in 2009.
Although the crop insurance and marketing
decisions studied by Pennings et al. were com-
plex, even they did not consider the impact of
farm program tools on risk management de-
cisions. Figure 2 presents a convenient picture of
thecompletesetoffarmprogramsafety nettools
coupled with the crop insurance tools and the
general price hedging decision. Although not
a complete model for analysis, the figure gives
someinsightintothecomplexityofthenewfarm
income safety net. It also reinforces the need for
future research and education on incorporating
Figure 2. The Farm Income Safety Net
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management strategy.
Summary
All three of the papers blended together well.
Harris listed reasons for southern avoidance
of the ACRE program, highlighting the mar-
keting and production risks of cotton and
peanut crops. Barnaby et al.’s approach to the
three programs was excellent. For years we
have heard that ad hoc disaster assistance
competes with and hindered the success of
crop insurance. Zulauf et al.’s approach illu-
minated the reasons for participation vs.
nonparticipation based on risk protection of-
fered. Perhaps we are finally getting to the
point of integrating agricultural policies into
a coherent risk protection package rather than
ad hoc politically designed programs. If so, it
has only taken three-fourths of a century.
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